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How Reason Almost Lost Its Mind is an unusual book, for several reasons. It is one of the very few 
examples of collective authorship of more than two or three writers in the Humanities/Social 
Sciences. Six renowned authors, some of whom were very well known, gathered in Berlin for six 
weeks in the summer of 2010 in order to produce the manuscript.  
The study that resulted from this process tries to investigate the gap between reason and rationality 
that opened up after World War II in the thinking of intellectuals who advised politicians and 
decision-makers in the United States during the Cold War era. This gap constitutes what the authors 
seek to analyze, they coin the term “Cold War rationality”. Unlike the historical actors of the study, 
the authors do not believe in the universality of the idea of rationality that emerged, matured and 
finally diffused into other fields of research, and even daily life, between the 1950s and the 1980s.  
The first chapter begins with mathematician Merrill Flood trying to gain insights into human 
decision-making by observing and questioning his three teenage children. Neither Flood nor most of 
his colleagues at the think tank RAND in Santa Monica had any doubts about the fact that rationality 
basically concerned rules, though conceptions of rationality had changed since they became central 
to “western” thinking during the Enlightenment. Erickson et al.1 give a rough outline of the historical 
direction of rationality between the 18th and mid-20th centuries, before raising the question of how 
rationality and rule-bound calculation processes could become so close after World War II.  
In chapter two, the procedures that allowed the Berlin Airlift to operate are described. Operation 
Vittles had to be planned and calculated according to a rule-set that was supposed to allow the 
population of Berlin to be supplied at minimum cost and with minimal effort, but that maximized 
output. Limited computing capacities rendered the complex calculations necessary for these 
procedures difficult, although the US Air Force had already begun to streamline operational 
 
1 The order, in which the authors appear on the cover was determined by computerized randomization. 
 
Goederle, Reason 
Serendipities 1. 2016 (2): 190–192 | DOI 191 
efficiency via scientific computing. Instead of sticking to an optimal solution found by the algorithm, 
which could not be achieved as decision-makers had no access to complete sets of information, the 
introduction of “satisficing” results helped to shape a way out of the dilemma.  
While chapters one and two shed some light on the formalization of decision-making under the 
constraints of a trend towards rationalization, the subsequent chapters scrutinize rule-bound 
rationality in action.  
Chapter three investigates the Cuban Missile Crisis, presenting the different viewpoints of 
researchers and advisors. While Herman Kahn—one of the key figures of the book and author of On 
Thermonuclear War (published in 1960)—believed in rational choice theory, its critics had severe 
doubts about its validity under conditions such as the Cold War. Among these critics were Charles E. 
Osgood and Irving Janis, both of whom were psychologists. Their concerns concerned the limits of 
rationality under extreme conditions. Osgood suggested a de-escalation of the arms race, and so 
developed a program that he called GRIT (Graduated and Reciprocated Initiatives in Tension 
Reduction). Janis’ concept of groupthink sought to explain the interference of emotions with 
rationally correct choices.  
Consequently, chapter four deals with small group interactions, studied by social psychologist Robert 
Freed Bales of Harvard, who also worked with RAND. Bales recorded group interactions and tried 
to extract fundamental dynamics in order to develop a model that allowed for the description of the 
basic processes in group formation. His method aimed to find reliable parameters for the building of 
stable and functional groups in terms of split-second decisions. In other words, the kind of decisions 
to be made by small groups of officers in the context of the Cold War.  
Chapter five focuses on Game Theory and both its mathematical and psychological dimension. Its 
development is scrutinized and illustrated by the famous Prisoner’s Dilemma, as described by Anatol 
Rapoport. According to the authors, Rapoport over concentrates on interactions and neglects the 
personalities of the people involved. Another laboratory researcher on the prisoner’s dilemma, 
Morton Deutsch, places too much emphasis on personal qualities. Both fragmented decision making 
in certain ways in order to make the underlying procedures objects amenable to formalization.  
Chapter six describes the end of Cold War rationality. After two decades of formalizing decision-
making in order to safeguard the (Western) world against the consequences of a possibly irrational 
decision, in the late 1970s it became apparent that there was a gap between the formal standards 
established and actual human performance. Game theorists reacted with disillusionment to this 
insight. At this time, Cold War rationality lost much of its energy, though it did not disappear 
completely and still lives on in certain fields of research and expertise.  
Beside the fact that “How Reason Almost Lost Its Mind” is a lucid, coherent argued and very well 
written masterpiece of the History of Science, it has further qualities that make it an extremely 
important contribution to a broader collection of academic fields. It delivers an outstanding social 
history of a particular, small, though very important and influential group of white Americans during 
the Cold War era. The people, scrutinized in this work shaped a certain perception of the “West” for 
most of the Post War era for most of the “western” world. “How Reason Almost Lost Its Mind” 
provides extensive and lucid insights into a particular cultural history, and raises questions that 
deserve further research. The dynamics of Soviet Cold War rationality, for example, upon which they 
touched briefly in the introduction.  
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However, exceeding its original value as an extremely rich and original investigation into the idea of 
rationality in the second half of the 20th century, the study lives up to the promise of collective and 
truly trans-disciplinarian scholarship in the Humanities and the Social Sciences.  
 
